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Internationalization as a Rearrangement of Ownership of Firms and Parts of Firms: 
Grindlays Bank, 1828-2000 
 
ABTRACT: Grindlays Bank, a British overseas bank, has a particularly long and rich history 
of changes in ownership, acquisitions and divestitures.  Consequently Grindlays provides a 
good example of the point that if one wishes to understand the internationalization process 
of the firm — the evolution of the geographical scope of operations — one must take into 
account the rearrangement of ownership of assets.  Furthermore, not only does the focal 
firm engage in these activities, but it may itself be the object of such reshuffling of 
ownership. 
1 Introduction 
Rearrangement of ownership of assets between firms can be an important part of the 
evolution of particular firms, including the evolution of a firm’s geographic scope.  This may 
seem an obvious point, but it is not part of the conventional story.  Even the literature on 
mergers and acquisitions treats these as discrete events and not as an integral mechanism of 
the evolution of firms.  However, selection acts not just on operations themselves but also 
on ownership.  That is, firms swap operations not because an operation necessarily is 
unsuccessful but rather because the acquirer expects to be able to manage it better.  As 
Capron et al., (1998) point out, “the market for business is often more robust than the 
market for resources.” 
Grindlays Bank is a particularly rich exemplar of this conception.  From its inception in 
1828 to its demise by absorption in 2000, Grindlays has undergone changes in ownership 
and has acquired and divested operations.   
The research strategy here is that of a case study.  Porter (1987; p. 45) has argued that, 
"Studying the diversification programs of a company over a large period of time is a much 
more telling way to determine whether a corporate strategy has succeeded or failed."  The 
present paper seeks neither to classify Grindlay’s history as a success or failure nor to judge 
the success or failure of strategies of international diversification.  But it builds on Porter’s 
point that understanding the evolution of any firm does require a longitudinal approach.  As   3
Prasad (1999) has argued, longitudinal, detailed studies can complement aggregate, cross-
sectional research.  In turn, applying different methods to the study of the same 
phenomenon enables researchers to develop a fuller understanding of that phenomenon.   
Lastly, the paper’s rhetoric, its argumentation, (McCloskey 1983) is, to use a metaphor 
from art, pointilist.  The paper uses the narration of a series of discrete events to create an 
impressionistic picture.  That is, history enters primarily not for its own sake but as the 
evidence (analogous to abstract or statistical models) illustrating the paper’s point.  Anyone 
who accepts the paper’s point can skim or even skip Sections 3 through 5.  Still, the paper’s 
antiquarian or collectors’ approach to the history itself does have a secondary objective.  The 
author hopes that the article will still serve as a reference source decades from now when no 
one will care about the point, but someone may find useful an account of when particular 
events occurred (Evans 1999, 59-60). 
 
2 General remarks 
The standard model of internationalization has the firm moving abroad incrementally as 
it acquires knowledge about distant markets.  Incremental growth certainly occurs.  
However, so does non-incremental growth and decline.  Andersson et al, (1997) extend the 
Uppsala Model (Johannson and Wiedersheim-Paul 1975, Johannson and Vahlne 1977 and 
1990) of incremental internationalization to incorporate “organic” acquisitions and this is a 
step forward.  However, contraction is as much a part of internationalization as expansion. 
As Calof and Beamish (1995) found, the incidence of single step investment, multiple step 
investment and de-investment depend on the nature of stimuli, the firm’s level of resources, 
experience and international skills, and the extent to which attitudes changed.   4
The mode of the evolution of the firm’s geographic scope often involves the acquisition 
and divestiture of whole operations.  In acquiring or divesting operations firms are 
rearranging the ownership of assets.  As Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) point out, firms 
rearrange ownership of assets when one firm lacking a comparative advantage relative to 
another firm with respect to a given operation sells it to that second firm.  There is an 
obverse and a reverse here: one firm’s divestiture is another firm’s acquisition.   
Major events in the evolution of a firm include the parent firm acquiring or divesting 
the focal firm itself or the focal firm acquiring or divesting operations.  These three sets of 
events—changes of ownership of the focal firm, and the focal firm’s acquisitions and 
divestitures—are themselves the manifestations of three sets of often inter-linked motives: 
extending an existing strategy, changing strategy and financing, the raising of funds.  
Obviously, in addition to the rearrangement of assets, firms expand and contract by opening 
or closing particular operations, however this issue is not part of the present paper. 
Instead, the present paper documents the rearrangement process in the case of 
Grindlays Bank.  The bulk of the history is novel to the literature.  Tyson’s (1963) biography 
of National Bank of India (NBI; see below for its relationship to the history of Grindlays) 
predates most of the events.  Jones’ (1993) magisterial study of the British overseas banks 
deals heavily with boardroom politics in London and devotes less attention to specific events 
in particular countries. 
Grindlays Bank had a history that dates back to the early 19
th Century and its operations 
spanned South Asia, Africa, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.  The bank was subject 
to several changes of ownership, the last of which, in 2000, resulted in the new owner, 
Standard Chartered Bank (SCB), completely absorbing Grindlays.  Grindlays’ history is more 
complex than that of most banks, whether international or predominantly domestic.  This   5
complexity is not just the result of the accretion of events over a long history.  The 
complexity arises also out of Grindlays being ab initio an international firm with head office 
in London and operations in South Asia (see below).  Because Grindlays was an overseas 
bank it had an unusual history of ownership changes. 
Furthermore, during its long existence Grindlays also acquired and disposed of 
operations, ranging in size from solitary branches to whole banks.  The paper’s argument is 
that acquisitions and divestitures are a normal part of the life of a firm.  However, it is only 
Grindlays’ extensive operations in Africa and South Asia that exposed it to an unusually rich 
set of incidents of forced divestiture.  But this highlights a subsidiary point: the evolution of 
a firm’s geographical scope is specific to a historical and geographical context. 
 
3 Changes in ownership 
Originally Grindlays Bank was a “free-standing company” in that it had its headquarters 
in the metropole and its primary operations in countries of the periphery (Wilkins 1998).  
However, as Jones (1998) points out with respect to the British overseas banks and the 
overseas banks (Jones 1995) from France, Germany, The Netherlands or Belgium, 
metropolitan operations were integral to their mission.  Even though almost all of its 
branches were abroad the overseas bank had to have a branch in the national capital to 
engage in foreign exchange transactions and to facilitate its trade financing.  Also, by virtue 
of being incorporated in a major financial center, with its head office and Board of Directors 
there and operating under the center’s laws and courts, the overseas bank was in a position 
to access equity and debt capital for deployment overseas.  Thus the structures of the 
overseas banks, like those of the free-standing companies in general, were a device for 
facilitating international flows of debt and equity capital (Hennart 1998).   6
Grindlays Bank began as Leslie & Grindlay, which functioned as agents and bankers to 
the Indian army and business community in India.  In 1820 Robert Melville Grindlay (1786-
1877) retired as a Captain from an undistinguished career with the India Army (Tyson 1963).  
On his return to the UK he maintained a correspondence with old friends that in turn led 
him to undertake a number of personal commissions of various kinds for them.  In time the 
volume was such that it justified him forming a business, Leslie & Grindlay, in London in 
1828.  The firm’s primary business apparently was arranging passage to and from India for 
its customers and their baggage.  Private banking followed.  As partners came and went the 
firm became Grindlay, Christian & Matthews in 1839 and Grindlay & Co from 1843.  Robert 
Melville Grindlay retired in 1852.  The firm opened related firms at Calcutta in 1854 and at 
Bombay in 1865 that in 1908 it transformed into branches that it administered directly from 
London.  In 1912 it added a branch in Simla; later other branches in India and what is now 
Pakistan followed.    
In 1923, the UK’s National Provincial Bank (now National Westminster and a 
subsidiary of Royal Bank of Scotland) acquired Grindlay & Co., registered it as a limited 
company, but ran it as a separate company.  Grindlay & Co. had sought the connection as 
the recent failure of other private banking partnerships had called the form into question 
(Tyson 1963).  Grindlay & Co. continued to operate as private bankers and Army agents 
(Baster 1929).  After World War I the major English clearing banks such as Lloyds, National 
Provincial and Barclays, began to establish ownership positions in overseas banks that, 
however, operated essentially independently of the parent.  (For a discussion of the largest of 
these, Barclays Bank (Dominion, Colonial and Overseas)—an amalgam in 1925 of The 
Colonial Bank, National Bank of South Africa and Anglo-Egyptian Bank—see Ackrill and 
Hannah (2001), and for its relationship to Barclays Bank see Vander Weyer (2000)).     7
The primary reason for the separation was the Bank of England and Montague 
Norman’s desire to insulate the clearing banks from overseas debacles (Kynaston 1999, p. 
163).  (The recent failures of some of the largest overseas banks such as Oriental Banking 
Corporation (1882), the New Oriental Banking Corporation (1892), and the Chartered 
Mercantile Bank (1892), among others, would have been in everyone’s mind.)  The clearing 
banks themselves probably welcomed the separation, and may have enlisted the BoE’s 
support in maintaining their cartel in an example of Breton and Wintrobe’s (1978) model of 
“moral suasion” as an exchange between regulator and regulated.  Between 1911 and 1974 
the BoE issued no new licenses for access to London clearing.  The lack of access to the 
clearing meant that all non-clearing banks had to have a correspondent relationship with a 
clearer if they wished to operate in the world’s premier financial center and deal in sterling. 
Grindlay & Co. changed its name to Grindlays Bank Ltd in 1947.  In 1948 National 
Provincial decided to withdraw from overseas banking and sold Grindlays Bank to the 
National Bank of India (NBI) for cash plus shares in NBI (Jones 1993).  NBI was a 
customer in London of National Provincial. 
NBI started in 1863 as the Calcutta City Commercial Bank.  The next year the bank 
changed its name to National Bank of India and moved its head office to London.  By the 
time it acquired Grindlays NBI had expanded out of present-day India, with branches in Sri 
Lanka (1881), Pakistan (1884), Burma (1886), Zanzibar (1893), Aden (1894), Kenya (1896), 
Bangladesh (1905), Uganda (1906), and Tanganyika (1916).  It also had had an unsuccessful 
foray into China with a branch in Hong Kong (1870-80) and another in Shanghai (1875-84).  
Its retreat from East Asia lasted for almost a century.   
For NBI the acquisition of Grindlays added little to NBI’s geographic scope.  Of 
Grindlays’ eleven branches (all in South Asia), only four were in cities in which NBI did not   8
already have one or more branches (Table 1).  As one might expect, the two banks tended 
both to be in the same larger cities, and both not to be in the same smaller ones.  A test 
(Appendix) shows that overall the two banks had avoided each other.  This is particularly 
striking as the two banks had to meet in such commercial capitals as Bombay or Calcutta. 
For the seventeen cities for which we have population figures for 1949, the correlation 
between the logarithm of the population and a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if 
the two banks both have branches in the city and 0 otherwise is –0.5.  This understates the 
situation as the two banks met in seven of the 16 cities for which we do have figures, and in 
only two of the eight generally smaller cities for which we do not have such figures.   
When NBI acquired Grindlays its intent was to continue to operate the two banks 
separately (Jones 1993) though there was some coordination.  For instance, in South Asia 
NBI opened only one more branch in India, and Grindlays opened none.  In Africa NBI 
concentrated on expanding further its existing presence in East Africa.  Grindlays, however, 
opened branches in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (now 
Zimbabwe), starting with a branch in Salisbury in 1953.  
Even though the two banks avoided each other geographically they also appear to have 
catered to different market segments, at least in India.  Karunatilake (1968) reports that NBI 
served large firms in the export import trade and had a substantial foreign exchange 
business; Grindlays held retail deposits and had a large number of small loans. 
In 1958 National Bank of India and Grindlays Bank merged under the title of National 
Overseas & Grindlays Bank.  (As Green and Kinsey (1999) point out, at the time the British 
overseas banks were changing their names to remove references to the Empire or to 
geographical specificity.)  The reason for the merger, despite the original intent to operate 
separately, was that Grindlays had suffered a series of problems, including losses on bad   9
debts in Calcutta (Jones 1993).  As a result of the merger, National Provincial Bank's 
shareholding in NBI became a nine per cent holding in the merged bank.  In 1959 the bank 
changed its name to National & Grindlays Bank (NGB).   
In 1961, NGB acquired Lloyds Bank’s Eastern branches in return for giving Lloyds a 25 
per cent share in NGB.  Lloyds sold because developments in Burma, India and Pakistan led 
it to lose confidence in the Eastern Division’s prospects (Winton 1982). 
In 1918 Lloyds had been interested in buying an interest in NBI but the Indian 
government had objected (Winton 1982).  In 1923, at the suggestion of the Bank of 
England, Lloyds had acquired the banking and pay operations of the faltering Cox & Co 
(Winton 1982).  This had brought Lloyds eight branches and two sub-branches in India, 
Burma and Egypt that Cox & Co. had established in their role as agent and banker to many 
British Army units, Royal Navy ships and the Royal Flying Corps.  Cox & Co. brought with 
it four branches in India that it had acquired when it merged with H.S. King & Co. in 1922 
to form Cox and Kings.  H.S. King & Co. was a private bank with business expertise in 
India.  As King, King & Co. it operated in Bombay, Delhi and Simla, and as King, Hamilton 
& Co. in Calcutta.  Lloyds early on (1926) sold its Egyptian branches to National Bank of 
Egypt but retained the branches in India, Burma and what is now Pakistan.
1   
At the time of the merger, Lloyds’ Eastern Division had ten branches in India, one in 
Kashmir, five in Pakistan, possibly three in what is now Bangladesh and one in Burma 
(Table 1).  Of these, five were in cities in which NGB did not already have branches.  Here 
too statistical testing (Appendix) shows a tendency for the two banks to have avoided each 
                                                 
1 Winton (1982) has a short but interesting account of the organizational difficulties Lloyds 
faced when it took over Cox & Co. and Henry S. King & Co. and of the difficulties in doing 
business in legal and cultural environments very unlike England.  Later dramatic events that 
affected Lloyds Eastern branches that he discusses include World War II and Partition.   10
other.  Also, here too the correlation between the natural logarithm of city population and 
both NGB and Lloyds having a branch in a city is –0.5.   
In 1968 National Provincial sold its nine per cent holding in NGB to Lloyds Bank.  
From 1918 to 1954 when it sold its shares to Lloyds, National Provincial had shared with 
Lloyds ownership of Lloyds and National Provincial Foreign Bank., which had branches in 
London, France, Belgium and Switzerland.  (Lloyds absorbed this subsidiary in 1986).  For 
some thirty years or more, National Provincial had allied itself with Lloyds in Europe, but 
through its ownership of NBI had nominally competed with Lloyds Eastern branches.    
Accounts by former managers of the bank make it clear that the three parts of NBG—
ex-NBI, ex-Grindlays and ex-Lloyds—retained a great deal of independence and that any 
amalgamation of the three banks did not extend to the branches (Kartikeyan 2000).  Many 
staff retained their identity as National, Grindlays or Lloyds men throughout their service, 
the three separate cultures coexisted and the Lloyds branches retained a separate nominal 
identity for many years (e.g. the designation National and Grindlays (Lloyds branch)).  This 
is consistent with Andersson et al.’s (1997) finding that there seems to be a strong tendency 
for acquired firms for some time to remain unaffected by the acquisition.  They argue that 
this is a consequence of the intent of the acquisitions being to strengthen an existing market 
network position rather than to establish a new one.   
In the case of Grindlays, the various operations could continue to operate separately 
because, as the data above shows, they were essentially non-overlapping.  Also, as several 
bankers’ reminiscences make clear:  
“Those days professional qualifications mattered less than ‘gentlemanly’ 
behaviour…  Bankers were not expected to be aggressive, never to criticise their 
competitors.  Looking back, one can say banking those days was sleepy but then all 
banks and bankers were expected to have a laid back style.” (Narasimhan 2000)   11
This is evocative of Hicks’ (1935, p.8) dictum, “The best of all monopoly profits is a 
quiet life.”  The world of the overseas banks appears to have been conducive to implicit and 
sometimes explicit collusion.  Money (1990), in 1965 Vice-Chairman of Barclays (Dominion, 
Colonial and Overseas), remarks on the existence of cartels in most of the British Empire 
where Barclays operated in the 1930s and 1940s.  He does so to point out that this was not 
the case in the Middle East because of the competition from local banks and French, 
Belgian, Italian, Greek and other banks.  Still, in many countries in the Empire a small 
number of banks, and a hardly larger number of expatriate bankers, placed their branches to 
avoid each other, or to co-exist in those cities large enough to support more than one 
foreign bank.  In those cities where the banks met the bankers also met in the small world of 
Imperial expatriates (Allen 1975). 
In 1969 Citibank (Citi) of the US took a 40 per cent stake in NGB.  Existing 
shareholders in NGB became shareholders in National & Grindlays Holdings (NGH) in a 
one-for-one share swap, with NGH owning 60 per cent of NGB.  Lloyds owned 41 per cent 
of NGH.  The cash infusion from Citi enabled NGB in 1969 to acquire all the non-
European and non-Turkish branches of Ottoman Bank (see below).  To gain Bank of 
England approval, Citi agreed that control would remain in British hands and that Citi would 
not acquire any more shares without the Governor’s agreement (Jones 1990b).  
Apparently the attraction in the acquisition for Citi was NGBs’ operations in India.  Citi 
had extensive rupee deposits because the Indian government was obliged to deposit rupees 
with United States banks in India against U.S. official aid.  Citi faced relatively little demand 
for those funds but NGB would provide an outlet for them.   
In 1975 NGB changed its name to Grindlays Bank.  At that time Citi contributed cash 
to recapitalize Grindlays after Brandts (see below), its merchant banking arm, had sustained   12
major losses in lending to property.  Lloyds was in no position at the time to provide 
extensive support as it too was absorbing heavy losses, in its case from foreign exchange 
dealings by a rogue trader in Lugano, Switzerland.  The need to recapitalize Grindlays lead 
Citi to increase its involvement instead of deferring to Lloyds with respect to the 
management of the bank.  Citi’s share in Grindlays rose to 49 per cent and Citi also took a 5-
year management contract that expired in 1981 and that provided for Citi to second what 
turned out to be three successive chief executive officers. 
Like the other British overseas banks, Grindlays had a generalist, seniority-based, 
collegial and paternalistic culture.  Narratives from the Indian operation mention that Citi 
introduced a performance-based system based on profitability and achievement.  Citi also 
introduced the first computers.  Citi was apparently unable to change the seniority-based 
system but was able to imbue some junior managers with the desire to move out and explore 
new horizons.  Citi also seconded senior managers to Grindlays “who could not perhaps 
reach greater heights in their own organization” but who blocked opportunities for existing 
managers (Kartikyan 2000).  The result was that in the mid-70s, Grindlays witnessed a large 
exodus of its Indian managers.
2   
In 1982 the bank changed its name to Grindlays Bank plc.  In 1983, unable to find a 
buyer for the bank, Lloyds and Citi reorganized the ownership of Grindlays through a 
complex share swap.  Citi came to own 49 per cent of Grindlays Holdings, with Lloyds Bank 
owning 21 per cent (41 per cent times 51 per cent).  Of the remaining 30 per cent, 11 per 
                                                 
2 Ambition met opportunity when after the First Oil Shock the demand for bankers in the 
Arabian Gulf grew suddenly, with the then rapidly growing Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International (BCCI; est. 1972) in particular taking many officers.  BCCI became one of the 
world's largest privately-owned financial institutions, with operations in over 70 countries.  
Regulators in seven key countries closed it in 1991 when it became clear that the bank had   13
cent was in the hands of Bahrain Middle East Bank, which had bought it from Mass 
Development, a Bahrain company.  No other shareholder held more than 5 per cent. 
Even after restructuring its ownership, Citi had made no secret of its desire to sell 
Grindlays.  Grindlays had started to expand into Latin America and Europe and in many 
countries was now coming into direct competition with Citi, and for that matter, Lloyds.   
At Lloyds, even before Brian Pitman (who was knighted in the late 90s) took over as 
CEO, the bank had started to divest international assets and refocus on the domestic retail 
market (Bátiz-Lazo and Woods 2000).  Most of the divestitures were representative offices 
or branches.  Lloyds kept such major operations as Lloyds Bank International (an amalgam 
of Lloyds Europe and Bank of London and South America that Lloyds absorbed in 1986), 
National Bank of New Zealand, and Lloyds Bank Argentina.  Pitman became CEO in 1983 
and implemented a strategy of focus (Rogers 1999).  Pitman declared “Where we are not a 
leader, or cannot aspire reasonably to leadership, our course will be to divest and capture the 
value for our shareholders...”  While selling some operations, Pitman expanded Lloyds’ 
domestic retail banking operations by buying Abbey Life and Cheltenham & Gloucester 
Building Society, before finally merging with TSB (ex-Trustee Savings Bank) in 1995.  
Fortuitously, at the time that Citi and Lloyds were seeking to disencumber themselves 
of Grindlays, ANZ Bank (Australia New Zealand) was looking around for an acquisition that 
would make it a multinational.  ANZ already had subsidiaries and branches in Fiji, New 
Guinea, New Zealand, Singapore and Hong Kong, but stockbroking analysts were urging it 
to grow further (Merrett 2002).  As one of the largest banks in Australia, it could not grow at 
home, at least not by merger and acquisition.  Having decided to grow abroad, it required 
                                                                                                                                                 
been insolvent for much of its existence and had only survived through fraud.  Regulators 
around the world then disposed of its local operations.   14
that potential acquisition targets work in the English language to reduce management 
problems.  It had looked at banks in California, which it found too expensive, and had bid 
unsuccessfully for Dao Heng Bank in Hong Kong.  Grindlays, with its lack of overlap with 
ANZ’s existing scope, its presence in countries closed to ANZ such as India, and its use of 
English fit ANZ’s requirements.   
In 1984 Citi and Lloyds gladly sold Grindlays to ANZ.  The original plan was that ANZ 
would run Grindlays at arms-length (Merrett 2002).  Within a year ANZ called in consultants 
McKinsey and Co. to design an organizational structure that would fit its strategy.  Still, 
ANZ took many years to acquire the skills to run Grindlays effectively and to be able to 
integrate the two banks’ operations.   
In 1989 ANZ changed the Grindlays name to ANZ Grindlays.  In 1992 Grindlays 
became ensnared in a securities scam in India.  Apparently ANZ lost confidence in the 
Indian management; between 1992 and 1998 the operation had 5 different CEOs.  Many 
senior staff left, feeling that only outsiders would have access to top positions (Senapati and 
Cherian 2000). 
In 2000 Standard Chartered Bank (SCB) bought Grindlays from ANZ.  SCB is the 
result of the merger in 1969 of Standard Bank and the Chartered Bank.  The Standard Bank 
began in 1862 as the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Chartered Bank began in 1853 
as the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China.  As a result, Standard Bank was 
particularly strong in Africa and Chartered Bank in Asia.  The Standard Bank had been a 
competitor of NBI, NGB and later Grindlays in Africa.  Chartered Bank had been a 
competitor in South Asia. 
SCB integrated Grindlays with its existing operations in a process completed by early 
2003, thus ending Grindlays’ separate existence.  In India, where SCB had a strong presence   15
that dated back to the Chartered Bank’s Kolkata (Calcutta) branch established in 1858, the 
acquisition made SCB the largest foreign bank even after it cut redundant branches and 
reduced the number of staff from 5500 to 3500.  In Pakistan, the merged operations made 
SCB the largest foreign bank in the country and the only one with branches in all four 
provinces.   
 
4 Acquisitions 
In addition to the operations that Grindlays acquired through merger, the bank also 
bought some operations.  The first such acquisition occurred in 1942 when Grindlay & Co. 
purchased the accounts of Thomas Cook & Son (Bankers).  Before WWII Thomas Cook & 
Sons (Bankers) had Asian offices in Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Delhi, Hong Kong, 
Peking, Rangoon, Shanghai, Singapore, Tientsin and Yokohama.  By end-1942 all but the 
cities in India and Ceylon were under Japanese military control. 
The Annual Report for Grindlays states that “the accounts at Bombay and Delhi have 
been taken over and the other branches will be taken over as and when the opportunity 
occurs”.  The other branches included a branch in Rangoon and one in Colombo, where 
NBI was also already in place.  However, due to the fall of Burma, the Rangoon branch must 
have closed for a period.  The April 1946 half-year report for Grindlays refers to the 
Rangoon branch, suggesting that Grindlays re-opened the branch shortly after the war.
3   
In 1965 NBG acquired two-thirds of the shares of William Brandts & Sons, a merchant 
bank established in 1805 and registered as a private limited company in 1952.  At the time a 
                                                 
3 Private communication from Jennifer Mountain, assistant archivist at Royal Bank of 
Scotland.  Unfortunately the Minute Book for Grindlays for 1941-1950 is missing. (Private 
communication from Peggy Kennedy, archivist for ANZ Bank.)  Interestingly, Tyson (1963) 
does not list Grindlays’ Rangoon branch among the branches of National and Grindlays 
though he does list the branch in Colombo.     16
cautious Bank of England blocked NBG from gaining full control (Jones 1990a; Kynaston 
2001).  In 1969 Grindlays acquired the remaining one-third but left the subsidiary to operate 
independently.  In 1976, after Brandts had got into trouble, Grindlays assumed more control 
and changed the name to Grindlays Brandts. 
In 1967 NGB acquired about a 10 per cent stake in National Bank of Dubai (NBD).  In 
1963, leading local merchants had established NBD as the first national bank.  At the time 
NGB had no branches in what would in 1971 become the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
In 1969 NGB acquired all of Ottoman Bank’s branches outside Turkey or Europe.  
Founded in 1863, Ottoman had an extraordinary history of its own (Autheman 1996 and 
Clay 1994).  Now, under the direction of its dominant shareholder, Banque de Paris et des 
Pays-Bas (Paribas), Ottoman had decided to focus on Turkey.  It spun off its branches in 
France and Switzerland into Banque Ottomane.  NGB bought Ottoman Bank’s branches in 
London, Cyprus, Jordan, Oman and Muscat, Palestine, Abu Dhabi, Sudan, Kenya and 
Rhodesia.  Apparently at that time NGB also bought into Société Nouvelle de la Banque de 
Syrie et du Liban, an affiliate of the Ottoman Bank and of Paribas, but sold out shortly 
thereafter.  (The branches in Palestine had operated under Jordanian rule and some may 
have operated until the early 1970s before closing, though the branch in East Jerusalem 
apparently closed in the wake of the 6-Day War.  In 1995 Grindlays reopened the branch in 
Nablus and two years later the branch in East Jerusalem, having retained the premises.  Then 
in 2002 it closed both the Nablus and Ramallah branches, exiting Palestine.)
4   
Also in 1969 NGB bought Mercantile Bank of India’s branches in Pakistan and what is 
now Bangladesh (Green and Kinsey 1999).  Mercantile had been suffering poor performance 
and was concerned about political uncertainty and government restrictions.  The attraction   17
for NGB was that the branches came with staff in place and the acquisition would enable it 
to grow despite the government’s restrictions on foreign banks opening new branches.  
In 1970 NGB acquired 50 per cent of Dao Heng Bank (DHB).  The acquisition enabled 
NGB to operate in Hong Kong despite the government moratorium on the granting of new 
banking licenses.  DHB had started in Hong Kong in 1921 and by the time that NGB 
bought it, DHB had grown into a large commercial bank.  Grindlays acquired full ownership 
in 1977 and changed the bank’s English name to Grindlays Dao Heng Bank Limited; the 
Chinese name remained Dao Heng. 
NGB also bought Cox and Kings (Holdings), which had subsidiaries in the business of 
travel and insurance agents, shipping and forwarding agents, warehousing and commodity 
dealing.  The acquisition was part of the bank’s policy of “extending the range of services to 
be made available to its customers at home and overseas…” (NGB 1970).  Cox and Kings 
still exists today as an upmarket travel agent specializing in travel to the Sub-Continent and 
challenging parts of the world. 
In 1971 Grindlays bought into Banque Ottomane and changed the bank’s name to 
Banque Ottomane Grindlays.  It also acquired the operations in Pakistan of Eastern Bank 
Limited.  Eastern Bank appears to have been a bank based in East Pakistan, which in 1971 
split from Pakistan and became Bangladesh. 
In 1972 National and Grindlays Bank (Uganda) acquired the Ugandan branches of 
Algemene Bank Nederland (ABN).  ABN sold because it was unwilling to incorporate its 
local branches under Ugandan law (see below). 
In 1974 NGB acquired the financially troubled British Bank of Commerce, a 
Glaswegian merchant bank.  The bank had begun in 1936 in London as a private company 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 “Grindlays reopening branch “April 7, 1995. The Jerusalem Post, Pg. 2. “StanChart to close Palestinian   18
but had moved to Glasgow in 1963 and converted to a public company in 1965.  From 
1963-69 it was associated with the London merchant bank Samuel Montagu & Co.  
Grindlays acquired it for Grindlays Brandts, and changed the name to Grindlays Bank 
(Scotland) in 1977.  Grindlays apparently absorbed the bank in about 1979. 
In 1979 Grindlays took over Banque Ottomane Grindlays and renamed it Grindlays 
Bank S.A.  Grindlays also acquired four branches in France from Bank of America that it 
folded into Grindlays Bank S.A. 
 
5 Divestitures 
Firms not only acquire operations, they also divest themselves of operations.  These 
divestitures can be involuntary or voluntary.  The involuntary divestitures are the easiest to 
classify and to comprehend.  The most clearly involuntary are those that a government has 
mandated.  These mandated divestitures too represent a re-arrangement of the ownership of 
assets, but in response to force majeure rather than arising from managers’ decisions. 
Robinson (1964) has referred to the period from 1945 to about 1975 as the National 
Era.  The National Era was a period of decolonization, nationalism, and Êtatism—state-led 
industrialisation.  Governments in many countries stigmatised private enterprise in general 
and the multinational enterprise or company (MNE/MNC) in particular.   
Around the world, especially in former colonies, governments nationalized the foreign 
banks and often the domestic banks as well.  Williams (1975) has a survey of the extent of 
nationalisation of foreign-owned assets over the period 1956-72.  Kobrin (1980) has an 
analysis of forced divestments of foreign ownership, though he focuses more on specific 
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cases rather than the blanket nationalisations that NGB endured in Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East. 
The first of several instances of nationalization that cost NGB operations occurred in 
1963 when the Burmese government nationalized all ten domestic and 15 foreign banks 
(Tyson 1963).  NGB’s branch in Rangoon, which dated back to 1885, became Peoples’ Bank 
Number Ten.  Tyson’s (1963) report that there was only one branch suggests that NGB had 
amalgamated the two Rangoon branches after the 1958 merger of NBI and Grindlays. 
NGB’s branch in Zanzibar traced its history back to 1893 when NBI entered shortly 
after the failure of the New Oriental Bank Corporation, which had established a branch 
there in 1891, just after Great Britain had established its Protectorate.  Still, in 1963 Zanzibar 
achieved its independence from the British Commonwealth.  The Revolution of 1964 
brought to power a Revolutionary Council that established a one-party state (the Peoples’ 
Republic of Zanzibar) that nationalized land and companies.  In 1964 Zanzibar united with 
Tanganyika to form the United Republic of Tanzania.  The Revolutionary Government of 
Zanzibar apparently closed the foreign banks and in 1966 established the Peoples’ Bank of 
Zanzibar, which the government still owns.  At the time the only banks were NGB, SCB and 
Jetha Lila, an Indian private bank (Tominaga 1989).  (Although it had closed Grindlays, the 
Peoples’ Bank used Grindlays, and to a lesser extent Moscow Narodny Bank, as its London 
correspondents and to hold the Government’s foreign currency revenues from the sale of 
cloves.)  
In 1967 Tanzania nationalized its banks, including NGB’s branches in Tanganyika.  NBI 
had established itself in Dar es Salaam in Tanganyika in 1916 after Great Britain drove the 
Germans into the bush.  The government consolidated the assets and liabilities of all seven 
foreign and two local banks in the government-owned National Bank of Commerce (NBC).    20
In 1997 the government reorganized NBC and early in 2000 it sold 55 per cent of NBC to 
Amalgamated Banks of South Africa (ABSA) and 15 per cent to the International Finance 
Corporation while retaining the remainder.  
In 1964, at the behest of the Minister of Finance, NBG, which had many branches in 
Aden and the Federation of South Arabia, entered into talks with Chartered Bank and local 
investors to create a local bank.  NBGs presence dated back to NBI’s entry in 1894; amongst 
other features, Aden had a large Indian community active in international trade (Schaeffer 
1999).  The plan was that NBG and Chartered would establish the Bank of South Arabia 
with each having 30 per cent of the equity and local investors sharing the rest.  Presumably 
each of the two parent banks would contribute its operations to the venture.  However, 
events intervened, apparently before anything could come of this. 
In 1967 the British left South Yemen after enduring a four-year war of independence, 
leaving behind the government of the newly independent People’s Republic of South 
Yemen, which was hostile to foreign enterprise.  The country became the first and only 
Marxist Arab state and in 1970 the government renamed the country the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).  Two economic events compounded the impact 
on the country’s economy.  First, the departure of the British meant the loss of the subsidy 
that had provided the bulk of the country’s budget.  Second, the closure of the Suez Canal as 
a result of the Six-Day Arab-Israeli war cut the number of vessels stopping in Aden by some 
80 per cent.  These events taken together resulted in a substantial fall in Gross National 
Product in the PDRY and the emigration of quarter of the country’s two million people, 
especially the commercial middle class.  Then in 1969 the government nationalized all almost 
all industry and commerce, including banking.  It combined the branches belonging to NGB, 
Chartered Bank, and possibly Bank of India, into the National Bank of Yemen (NBY).    21
Currently (2002) the government is seeking to privatize NBY by selling 60 per cent to a 
strategic investor. 
In 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre seized power in Somalia and subsequently 
nationalized the four foreign banks, the only private banks in the country.  NGB lost its 
branches in Hargeisa and Berbera in former British Somaliland and its branch in Mogadishu. 
NBI had established its first branch in the country in Hargeisa in 1952.  The government 
amalgamated all the banks into the Somali Commercial Bank and then in 1975 combined 
this and the Savings Bank of Somalia to form the Commercial and Savings Bank of Somalia, 
the sole bank in the country.  This bank failed in 1990 and nothing has replaced it.   
Also in 1969 NGB created National and Grindlays Bank (Uganda) to take over its 
branches in Uganda and its commercial banking activities.  NGB’s presence in Uganda dated 
back to NBI’s opening of a branch in Kampala in 1906.  The ownership of the new 
subsidiary was 51 per cent NGB and 49 per cent government and the sale of the equity to 
the government was compulsory (Brownbridge 1998).  NGB retained a management 
contract for National and Grindlays Bank (Uganda) until 1974.  In 1971 NGB established 
National and Grindlays Bank International (Uganda), which it fully-owned, to take over its 
international and merchant banking activities; the Government had the option to acquire 49 
per cent in this bank too if it desired.  In the late 1970s, Grindlays transferred or sold almost 
all of the branches of National and Grindlays Bank (Uganda) to the government-owned 
Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB; Brownbridge 1998).   
In 1970 Sudan too nationalized its banking system.  NGB’s branches, which it had 
acquired in 1969 from Ottoman Bank, which in turn had entered in 1948, became the 
Omdurman National Bank.  In 1984 Omdurman merged with the Juba Commercial Bank 
(the former branches of Commercial Bank of Ethiopia) to become Unity Bank.  In 1993 the   22
government grouped the Unity Bank, the National Export Import Bank and Bank of 
Khartoum into the Khartoum Bank Group.  Bank of Khartoum traces its origins to the State 
Bank of Foreign Trade, which the government established in 1970 to acquire the branches 
of Barclays Bank.  Barclays in turn traced its presence back to the entry of the Anglo-
Egyptian Bank in 1913.  Currently (2002) the government is preparing the Bank of 
Khartoum for privatization.  
In Kenya NGB faced partial and phased nationalization.  NGB’s presence in Kenya 
traced its roots back to NBI’s opening of a branch in Mombasa in 1896.  In 1970 the 
Kenyan government created Kenya Commercial Bank (KCB) to take over all but three of 
NGBs’ branches in Kenya.  The Kenyan government initially owned 60 per cent of KCB 
and NGB owned 40 per cent, with NGB also having a management contract.  However in 
1976 the government acquired the remainder of the shares.  In recent years the Kenyan 
government has privatized KCB though it still owns 35 per cent.  In the meantime, NGB 
incorporated its two remaining branches into National and Grindlays Bank International 
(Kenya), of which it owned 60 per cent and the government owned 40 per cent.  This bank 
now belongs to Stanbic.   
In 1970 in Sri Lanka the Hatton Bank acquired NGB’s branches in Kandy and Nuwara 
Eliya while NGB retained its branch in Colombo.  Hatton restructured itself to become 
Hatton National Bank with NGB taking a 28 per cent share that it apparently sold within a 
few years.  In 1961 the Sri Lankan government had forbidden foreign owned banks to take 
deposits from Sri Lankan nationals.  In return for transferring its branches outside Colombo 
to a Sri Lankan bank, NGB gained the right to take deposits at the Colombo branch.  
Similarly, Mercantile Bank of India transferred several branches to Commercial Bank of   23
Ceylon, which in turn had been the Colombo branch of Eastern Bank, a subsidiary of 
Chartered Bank.  
In 1971 Grindlays established Grindlays Bank (Zambia) to take over the branches there.  
In 1968-69 the Zambian government had discussed taking over 51 per cent of the shares of 
banks but nothing came of this (Harvey 1991).  Still, transferring branches from the parent 
to a subsidiary would have facilitated accommodating such a requirement had it ever become 
necessary. 
In 1973 the government of Bahrain took over the 25 per cent of National Bank of 
Bahrain (NBB) that was not in Bahraini hands and that Grindlays had subscribed to in 1957 
when the bank was being organized as the Bank of Bahrain.  Grindlays received a license to 
open a branch in its own name as compensation for losing its stake in NBB.  
In 1976, the Derg, the ruling council of Ethiopia after 1974, nationalized Addis Ababa 
Bank, which NGB had established in 1963 and of which it owned 40 per cent.  The 
Government also merged in the Eritrean affiliates of Banco di Roma and Banco di Napoli 
and changed the name to Addis Bank.  In 1963 the Ethiopian government had passed a law 
permitting foreign banks to establish subsidiaries so long as Ethiopian nationals owned 51 
per cent or more of the equity.  In the same year the government split the State Bank of 
Ethiopia into the National Bank of Ethiopia and the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia.  Then in 
1980 the Government merged Addis Bank into the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, which it 
is now trying to privatize. 
In 1982 Grindlays sold back to the National Bank of Dubai (NBD) its shares in NBD.  
Apparently the UAE authorities wanted to reduce the percentage of foreign ownership in 
the bank and had ruled that local banks had to be 80 per cent local-owned.  Bank of America 
also sold its shares back, and National Bank of Kuwait halved its 20 per cent stake.     24
In 2000 an Emiri Decree authorized the establishment of Grindlays Bank Qatar to 
assume Grindlay’s Doha branch.  Qatar’s minister of foreign affairs, Sheikh Hamad bin 
Jassem bin Jaber Al Thani, acquired 60 per cent of the capital of the new bank (mainly via 
family proxies) and SCB retained 40 per cent in return for contributing its branch.  
Apparently the Emir’s advisory council had earlier examined the proposed transaction as 
Central Bank regulations required and found that several technicalities were not in order.  
When the council referred the matter to the Emir’s cabinet for further consideration the 
Emir intervened to approve the sale (Owen 2000). 
Lastly, in the UAE SCB’s acquisition of Grindlays left it with 11 branches (seven SCB 
and four Grindlays) whereas Central Bank regulations limit foreign banks to eight.  In late 
2001 Stan Chart announced that it would close, consolidate or dispose of three Grindlays 
branches.  SCB’s presence in the UAE dates back to a branch the Chartered Bank 
established in Sharjah in 1958 and Grindlays presence to a branch the Ottoman Bank 
established in 1962 in Abu Dhabi. 
The most clearly voluntary divestitures occur when the firm changes its strategy and 
consequently sells or closes operations that now are inconsistent with the new strategy.  
Grindlays’ divestitures of its operations in France, Africa, Canada and Oman are apparently 
examples of such strategic moves. 
In 1990 ANZ Grindlays sold Grindlays Bank SA (the ex-Banque Ottomane Gindlays) 
with its branches in France, Switzerland and Monaco to Monte dei Paschi di Siena, which 
renamed it Monte Paschi Banque.  At the time ANZ Grindlays stated that the 14-branch 
bank, although an efficient retail bank, no longer fit with its strategy for Europe.   
In 1992 ANZ Grindlays sold all its African operations to Standard Bank Investment 
Corporation (Stanbic).  Stanbic assumed control of ANZ Grindlays’ banks in Zimbabwe,   25
Zambia, Kenya, Botswana, Uganda and Zaire, as well as its significant minority stakes in 
banks in Nigeria and Ghana.
5  In Botswana, Stanbic merged the newly established ANZ 
Grindlays Botswana with its newly established subsidiary Union Bank of Botswana to form 
Stanbic Bank Botswana.  In Uganda, by the mid-1990s, Stanbic had consolidated Grindlay’s 
two subsidiaries into one bank, Stanbic Bank Uganda.  In 2002 Stanbic acquired 80 per cent 
of the shares of the Uganda Commercial Bank from the Ugandan Government in a 
controversial privatization.  Later Stanbic merged UCB into Stanbic Bank Uganda.  The 
government took a 10 per cent stake in the merged bank in compensation for its remaining 
20 per cent stake in UCB. 
Interestingly, Stanbic at one time had been the core of Standard Bank of South Africa.  
In response to sanctions on South Africa, SCB sold its by then 39 per cent minority position 
in the South African operation to existing South African shareholders in 1987; the divested 
operation became Stanbic.   
In 1993 ANZ Grindlays sold its Canadian operations to Hongkong Bank of Canada, a 
subsidiary of Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.  Grindlays had apparently 
established a finance company in Canada in 1975 and then converted that to a banking 
subsidiary after Canada revised its Banking Act in 1980 to permit such operations.  ANZ had 
acquired Grindlays Bank Canada with its acquisition of Grindlays but management was more 
interested in expanding in the Asia-Pacific area. While it was selling the European and 
Canadian operations, ANZ was acquiring the Bank of Western Samoa, establishing a joint-
                                                 
5 Grindlays had established National Finance and Merchant Bank in Ghana in 1972.  The 
ownership was 30 per cent Grindlays, 30 per cent Government of Ghana and 40 per cent 
public sector financial institutions.  In 1975 the bank changed its name to Merchant Bank 
Ghana.  Grindlays had established Grindlays Merchant Bank of Nigeria in 1983, at which 
time it took the maximum permissible 40 per cent ownership.  Grindlays had established 
Grindlays Bank (Zimbabwe) in 1990 to take over the branches there.    26
venture subsidiary in Indonesia, and establishing branches and opening representative offices 
in the Peoples Republic of China and in Vietnam. 
Similarly, in 1996 ANZ Grindlays sold to the newly created Oman Savings and 
Financing Bank (OSFB) the branches in Oman that NGB had acquired with its purchase in 
1969 of Ottoman Bank’s foreign operations.  (Ottoman Bank had entered earlier that year.)  
Next year OSFB bought Commercial Bank of Oman (CBO) but retained the latter’s name.  
In 1993 CBO had purchased three of SCB’s four branches in the Sultanate.  CBO later 
merged with Bank of Oman, Bahrain & Kuwait and in 2000 merged into BankMuscat. 
Some divestitures represent a rationalization of operations rather than a change in 
strategy.  In 1985, ANZ, which had had a branch in New York since 1968, closed the agency 
there that Grindlays had established in 1975.  In 2001, the year after it acquired Grindlays, 
SCB sold its concomitant 40 per cent stake in Grindlays Bahrain to local investors, who 
renamed the bank the Commercial Bank of Bahrain (CBB); CBB has since merged in Ahli 
United Bank.  SCB already had its own operation in Bahrain, whose genealogy dated back to 
the entry of Eastern Bank in 1920, and chose to divest itself of Grindlays Bahrain.  Grindlays 
had established the subsidiary in 1984 to acquire its branch there, which it had established in 
1974.  It made the conversion in order to be able to bid for types of government business, 
such as putting up performance bonds on government contracts.  The government had 
changed its rules to exclude foreign banks two years earlier, cutting Grindlay’s branch off 
from what had been a major line of business.   
In 2002 SCB sold its branch in Srinagar to the state-owned Jammu and Kashmir Bank.  
Srinagar was a Lloyds’ branch that Cox & Co. had opened in 1907.  SCB reportedly “decided   27
to exit the Valley after considering the security, logistics and business opportunities.”
6  SCB 
also sold the branch in Simla that Grindlays had opened in 1912 and the one in Darjeeling 
that Lloyds had opened in 1935 to ICICI Bank, the largest private sector Indian bank.
7    
Also in 2002 SCB sold the Geneva branch and private banking business that it acquired 
with its purchase of Grindlays.  SCB had integrated Grindlays private banking operations in 
London and Luxembourg and the subsidiary in Jersey into its own private bank, which 
serves millionaires in Hong Kong, Dubai and Johannesburg under the Standard Chartered 
Grindlays Offshore Financial Services name.  The purchaser of the Geneva bank was 
Prudential-Bache International.  (Interestingly, when ANZ had acquired Grindlays, ANZ 
had sold its Guernsey-based private banking operation to Bermuda's Bank of Butterfield 
International while keeping the Grindlay’s Jersey bank.) 
In 2001-2 SCB attempted to sell the two branches in Greece (Athens and Pireaus) that it 
inherited from Grindlays, which had entered in 1974.  Talks with Egnatia Bank, following 
earlier ones with Aspis Bank, broke down.  Apparently the two sides could not reach an 
agreement on staff issues and on other conditions that SCB had imposed.  (Aspis did 
purchase the retail banking activities of ABN AMRO, which took a seven percent 
shareholding in Aspis.) 
Mixed situations, that is situations that involve both changes of strategy and outside 
pressures, can occur when the firm sells operations to raise funds.  A situation where the 
firm uses the funds to cover loses elsewhere and hence to maintain itself is towards the 
involuntary end of the spectrum.  A situation where the firm sells operations that are less 
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central to its strategy and uses the funds to expand operations that are more central are 
towards the voluntary end of the spectrum.  These divestitures mix strategic motives with 
financial ones.   
In 1982 Grindlays sold Dao Heng Bank to the Hong Leong Group of Malaysia and 
Singapore.  Grindlays had reached a fork in the road: it had either to put in more capital into 
now Grindlays Dao Heng to permit it to grow further, or to sell out and use the money to 
recapitalize itself after the losses at Brandts (Hall 1982).  The decision was to sell.  At the 
time of the sale Grindlays Dao Heng was one of Grindlays’ most profitable overseas 
operations and represented almost a third of Grindlays total assets.  The new owners, the 
Kwek family led by Kwek Hong Png, who had established the Hong Leong company 
privately more than 40 years earlier, then took over the direct management; nineteen years 
later they sold Dao Heng to Development Bank of Singapore.  
In 1983 Grindlays sold its operations in the part of Cyprus still under Cypriot 
government control to Cyprus Popular Bank, the second largest bank in the country.  
Grindlays had acquired the branches in Cyprus in 1969 from Ottoman Bank; the then 
Imperial Ottoman Bank had entered Cyprus in 1864.  However, in 1974 the Turkish 
government invaded northern Cyprus and carved out the breakaway Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus.  Grindlays responded by choosing to combine discretion with capital 
raising.  The company stated that although its Cyprus operation was still profitable it "had 
little prospect of contributing to the group's profits in London in the foreseeable future..." 
8   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The branch in Simla may have incorporated an earlier branch that Cox & Co. had founded.  
When SCB sold the branch, press reports spoke of the branch having been established in 
1877. 
8 “Grindlays to sell Cyprus operation” November 5, 1982, Financial Times, 22.   29
6 Conclusion 
As the foregoing account has made clear , the rearrangement of the ownership of assets 
between banks was a large part of the story of the determinants of Grindlays’ geographic 
scope.  Recent work by Tschoegl (2002) indicates that the same process of rearrangement 
was common in the growth of the largest US subsidiaries of foreign banks.  These 
rearrangements involve changes that are far from incremental.  Rather, the changes are 
abrupt and large-scale.   
Sources external and internal to the bank provoked the changes.  External sources were 
primarily political as governments nationalized or forced divestiture of local operations.  
Internal sources in the form of decisions by existing management generally gave rise to 
acquisitions representing extensions of existing strategy.  Lastly, internal changes in the form 
of decisions by new owners gave rise to changes in strategy resulting in both acquisitions and 
divestitures.  
As far as generalizeability to other industries is concerned, it is important to remember 
the Lichtenberg and Seigel wrote about industrial plants in the US.  Although bank branches 
appear to be transferable modules that the acquirer can readily convert to its own routines, 
the Lichtenberg and Seigel results make plain that manufacturing too partakes of the 
process.  This would suggest that a fruitful direction for future research would be to start to 
map the degree to which different industries exhibit the rearrangement of the ownership of 
assets and the industry determinants of the degree of fungibility.   
Today Grindlays has effectively disappeared but its legacy continues, in part in ironic 
form.  Former Grindlays’ branches are part of locally-owned banks in Burma, Cyprus, India, 
Kenya, Oman, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, and Yemen.  More curiously, Standard Chartered 
Group, the owner of Grindlays non-African operations, is competing in Africa with Stanbic,   30
whose operations outside of South Africa once belonged to Grindlays.  Stanbic, however, 
originated in the South African operations of the Standard Bank of South Africa, which in 
turn was the Standard Bank that merged with the Chartered Bank in 1969, but which had 
divested itself of its South African operations in 1987.  
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Appendix: The Hypergeometric Test 
This Appendix draws on Rose and Ito (2000). 
Assume that NBI has the resources to operate in s markets.  Grindlays has the resources 
to operate in t markets where t ≤ s ≤ n, and where n is the total number of markets.  Let us 
define a discrete random variable 0 ≤ F ≤ n that represents the number of markets in which 












where Ca,b) = a!/(a-b)!b! denotes the number of combinations of a objects taken b at a time 
and ∑ p(ƒ) = 1 for ƒ = [0,t].  Then F follows the hypergeometric distribution.  The 


















We can test the hypothesis that NBI and Grindlays meet more (or less) frequently than 
by chance alone by computing a Z-score based on A, the actual number of markets in which 







We can test the significance using the Student’s t distribution with (n-1) degrees of 









    
 n  s  t  A  µ  σ Z  Prob 
NBI&Grindlays  21 17 11  7  8.90  0.92  -2.07  0.05 
NGB&Lloyds 26 16 21 12  12.9  1.00  -0.93  0.36   36
 
Table 1: Location of NBI, Grindlays and Lloyds’ South Asian branches at the time of 
the mergers 
Country and city  NBI Grindlays Lloyds2 
      
India     
Amritsar  1900  1930 
Bangalore 1951     
Bombay 1865  1865  1908  (2) 
Calcutta 1863  1854  1911  (2) 
Chowringhee     ? 4 
Cochin 1910     
Darjeeling     1935 
Delhi  1889  1916 
Kanpur 1896     
Madras 1877  (2)  1944  1951 
New  Delhi  1948 1934 1927 
Simla   1912  
Srinagar     19074 
Tuticorin 1892     
Pakistan     
Karachi  1884 (2)  1924 (2)  1908 (3) 
Lahore  1900 1926 1928 
Peshawar   1936  
Quetta   1934  
Rawalpindi     1907 
Bangladesh     
Chittagong 1905  (2)    19484 
Dacca     19504 
Khulna 1951    19544 
Sri Lanka or Ceylon       
Colombo 1881  19433   
Kandy 1892     
Nuwara Eliya  1892     
Burma     
Rangoon   19423 19214 
Source: Tyson 1963; Winton 1982. 
Notes: 1) The date represents the year in which the bank first established a branch in the city in question.  The 
number in parentheses indicates the number of branches. 2) Lloyds’ branches dated prior to 1923 represent 
branches that Lloyds acquired from Cox & Co., except for the Delhi branch, which Cox & Co. had acquired from 
H.S. King & Co. 3) Branches that Grindlays acquired from Thomas Cook (Bankers).  The Rangoon branch 
probably did not actually begin operating until after WW II.  (See text).  4) Winton mentions the Rangoon and 
Chowringhee branches but Tyson does not.  Also Winton’s count of ten branches in India does not include 
Srinagar, which he allocates separately to Kashmir.  Tyson mentions the Chittagong and Dacca branches but not 
Khulna; Winton mentions Kuhlna but not Chittagong and Dacca. 
 
 